largely ineffective against his own moral psychology becomes intelli.gible when we realize that Aristotle is not critizing his own bipartite psychology.
Rather he is cx'iticizing a particular kind of bipartition that was developed in the Academy out of tripartition by bringing together the spirited and the appetitive faculties. A closer look at 432b5-6 will help to make this point clearer.
Here Aristotle is criticizing bipartition, but instead of employing the label to logon §£hon to refer to the logical half, he uses the label �stikon which belongs to the voccbu lary of tripartition (432a25).
Is this a confusion? Perhaps, but only a very minor one. For Aristotle is Cl"iticizing a variety of bipartition. which identifies the logical half with the logistiko� of tripartition.
Aristotle has in mind that kind of bipartition which is already suggested in the Republi.£ 1 8 . and clearly indi cated in the Timaeus -a dialogue which groups together the spirited and appetitive elements as the mortal soul�taiposes this combination to the !ogi�'?,!! as the immortal soul.
Apparently tripartition and this related f or-.in of bipartition enjoye• a contemporaneous life within the Academy. At least the Topics, which seems frequently to reflect discussion in the Academy, introducas for illustrative pur poses not only tripartition but also that version of bipartition which is a variation on tripartition ( 1 29al0-1 6). 1 9. we may suspect that just as in the Topics Aristotle takes note of two Academic psychologies, so in the � .Anima
Aristotle is concerned with members of the Academy, when he criticizes those who advance tripartition and those who advance bipartition (432a24-2 6).
The Timaeus can help us to understand Aristotle 1 s charge that the �isthetikon cannot be comfortably located in either the logical or alogical soul t432aJ0-31). 'While the Timaeus introduces tripartition a."'ld even assigns each of the three psychic parts i·ts own bodily location, the Timaeus, as we have already said, presents a bipartite version of tripartition.
The !2_gistikon is divine and elevated spatially to a seat in the head.
The other two psychic parts are mortal and are located in the trunk of the body.
For our purposes the important point is that the Timaeus not only employs this bipartite version of,tripartition but also attempts to handle sense perception.
And this attempt seems to result in just the kind of difficulty which Aristotle asserts does occur when the· sensitive faculty is referred to bipartition.
For at one time the Timaeus seems to treat the logistikon or immortal soul as the center of consciousness to which sensory motions are transmitted (43-44, 64B) , and at another time it seems to associate the mortal soul with aisthesis (61C, 69D). In this regard certain passages are especially difficult, if not confusing.
In explaining pleasure and pain, the Timaeus first connects sensation with the Ehronimo� (64B.5, apparently the brain which is the locus of the immortal soul or logistikon) 2 0.and subsequently refers pleasurable sensations caused by sudden replenishments to the mortal soul (6.5A.5).
The effects of bad odors are said to extend from the head to the navel (67.A.4-5) 2 and so would seem to affect the entire soul, both its mortal and imIJiortal portions'.!-� ti.s i m ilarly, hearing is described as a process extending not only to the brain and head (67B3-4) but also· to the liver (67 B.5) . 22 •And finally discussing the maintenance of mortal creatures, the Timaeus first introduces plants which are said to possess the epith:>r.:tnetikon and aisthesis (77B3-6) and then considers veiils which not only water the body but also dividein · .the region of the head and so seem to serve the brain and logisE:�on in regard to SGnse perception (77D6-E6)23.
tt. 'Whether or not we think that each of these passages�:presents a difficulty for the location of sensation within a bipartite version of tripartition, we can, I th in k, ag ree that collectively these passages do indicate a problem.
We can agree24·
W·that in the Timaeus Plato has not altered sufficiently his psychic framework to house the scientific (or biological) faculty of sensation. .And we may suspect that when Aristo-e!e critizes pipartition for its inability to hand � � sensation he is thi. nking ()f bipartition much as it appears in the Timaeus.
·He is thinking of certain members of the Academy who collapsed the spirited and appetitive faculties into/ one and so f. ormed a bipartite version of tripartition. In the first place it seems more natural to construe bouleumaton (1079) closely with manthano (1078). By reasoned reflection Medea has learned that she is about to do evil (1078). But her reflections are powerless to affect her emotion so that she declares her angry emotion stronger than her reasoned reflections (1079).
In the second place and more importantly, Diller' s arguments seems to focus too closely on the single word bouleumata and on the monologue itself.
We should, I think, take note of Medea rs second meeting with Jason (866-893). For in the course of this meeting the emotion of Medea is said to be controlled by reasoned reflection and this reflection is twice (893, 913) referred to by words cognate with bouleumata. Perpaps similarities in vocabulary should not be pressed.
Still it may be observed that this exchange between l'!edea He must respond out of character and without reasoning (EN 1117al7-22) . To illustrate further emotional response in sudden situations we may take a hint from Plutarch (Mo:r.alia 475A) and refer to Odysseus' meeting with the dog Argos.
When OdysSllS and Ewuaios reach the palace, they come upon the ancient and all but dead Argos. The dog recognizes his former master and struggles in vain to move off the du.'"lg heap where he lies. Odysseus is moved by the p�t.µetic sight of Argos and turns aside to wipe away a tear unnoticed by Eumaios �191-305).
As Plutarch comments, Odysseus fell into ·this situati(')n quite suddenly and unexpectedly (475A). His behavior is not the result of reasoning (whether reflection about how one should respond to the situation or deliberation about how to prepare for the situation ) . Rather it is an expression of emotion quite in keeping with Odysseus character. He sheds a tear but also turns away and so escapes the notice of Ewnaios.
We can contrast this response with Odysseus' behavior a little earlie r whe n reviled by the goatherd Melanthios.
The words of
Melanthios stir the heart of Odysseus (17.215-216 
